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The Other Path of the Law
Arthur J. Jacobsont
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known
profession.... The reason why it is a profession, why people will
pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies
like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges
in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if
necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees.... The object of
our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.'
Certain new attitudes toward the state have emerged. The bureaucracy
has lost social standing. Citizens have resigned themselves to the fact
that they must corrupt public officials if they want their needs to be
satisfied .... The inefficiency of the law courts has given rise to a
growing disenchantment with, and loss of confidence in, law-
enforcement mechanisms. This in turn has led to increasing
dissatisfaction with the status quo, which, coinciding with a gradual
increase in new activities, has steadily reduced the state's social
relevance.'
This Essay attempts to assess the contribution of the informal economy to
jurisprudence. The very idea of an informal economy suggests that there ought
to be no contribution at all. Of what possible relevance to jurisprudence are the
activities of people who flee the law or just do not seek it out? The informal
economy teems with inlaws and outlaws-tax cheats, drug dealers,
undocumented aliens, smugglers, street vendors, sweatshop owners-the last
people on earth we expect or hope to influence our fundamental attitudes
towards law. But they do, and the fact that they do is, in my view, an
unmitigated good.
The jurisprudence we get from the informal economy is one that enhances
our power as citizens, that cultivates personality instead of suppressing it, that
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puts persons, not the state, at the center of jurisprudence. I call this
jurisprudence bred in the informal economy "dynamic jurisprudence," as
opposed to the state-oriented, "static jurisprudence" of the formal economy.
The difference between dynamic and static jurisprudence focuses on the
idea of correlation. Static jurisprudence insists that rights and duties be
correlated. That is to say, for every right possessed by one person, there must
be another who owes a mirror-image duty, and for every duty there must be
a mirror-image right. In order for rights and duties to be in correlation, static
jurisprudence supposes the role of an agency-typically the state-that defines
the correlations and restores them to balance when they go out of whack.
Dynamic jurisprudence, by contrast, operates without the benefit of a
correlating agency. Persons must make their demands upon other persons for
fairness and justice. Dynamic jurisprudence requires persons, as an ordinary
incident of legality, to break or alter the correlation of rights with duties; it is
state-avoiding jurisprudence. This difference between static and dynamic
jurisprudence-that one correlates rights with duties, while the other does
not-leads to disparate conceptions of norms, discordant expectations of the
role of legality in social life, and distinctive accounts of legal personality and
institutions.3
Static jurisprudence initially distinguishes the formal from the informal
economy by setting a boundary between legal and nonlegal social processes.
The state places the boundary where the reach of its regulations ends, and
where the state stops its enforcement. The formal economy uses static
jurisprudence and obeys its restraints; the informal economy does not.
Dynamic jurisprudence, however, sets no boundary. Always expansive,
dynamic jurisprudence bombards the boundary set by static jurisprudence,
alters the boundary's relative position, and even leaves a trace4 on the core of
3. See infra Part I. Professor Feige kindly pointed out during the symposium that the word "dynamic"
could mislead social scientists, who understand the term to mean what economists mean: something that
changes over time. In this sense, even static jurisprudence can be "dynamic" in that the universe of norms
might very well look different at T2 than at T1. I use the term "dynamic" differently. A jurisprudence is
"dynamic" when it is impossible to take a snapshot of the universe of norms at any single moment, because
persons can never follow norms in dynamic jurisprudence without changing them. A static jurisprudence
is not "dynamic" in that it is possible to take a snapshot of the universe of norms at times T, and T2, even
though the snapshots may be different.
4. Economists have discussed measuring the hidden economy through "traces." Bruno S. Frey &
Werner NV. Pommerehne, Measuring the Hidden Economy: Though This Be Madness, There Is Method in
It, in THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 3-19 (Vito Tanzi ed., 1982)
[hereinafter TANzI]; see also Frank I. Michelman, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). For a philosophic account of the "trace," see JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATO-
LOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976). For guides of the perplexed to Derrida, see DECONSTRUCTION AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992); DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE LIMIT (1992); JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER
STRUCTURALISM (1982); J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
For a Derridean approach to microeconomics, see David G. Carlson, On the Margins of Microeconomics,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867 (1993).
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static jurisprudence: the jurisprudence of the formal economy. Thus altered,
formal jurisprudence5 incorporates and absorbs dynamic elements.6
Dynamic jurisprudence leaves a trace on formal jurisprudence when the
boundary between the formal and informal economies is permeable; that is,
when the state is ready to enforce at least some informal processes. The trace
may then be found in doctrines and institutions by which ordinary persons alter
or oppose the norms of static jurisprudence, much as they alter or oppose these
norms by participating in the informal economy.
7
The United States has a relatively permeable legal system, and its formal
economy is vigorously decentralized. The dominant, but by no means
exclusive, jurisprudential style in the United States is devoted to bridging the
gap between static and dynamic. This jurisprudence is common law, which
may be understood as a jurisprudence of permeability between static and
dynamic, between the formal and informal sectors. Central doctrines of the
formal jurisprudence in the United States, such as individual rights in public
law and fiduciary obligation in private law, reflect the trace of dynamism.
To common lawyers in the United States, the notion that theirs is a
dynamic jurisprudence of permeability ought to be unremarkable. They
experience dynamism and permeability as a fact, since practice calls upon them
5. 1 use the term "formal jurisprudence" to refer to the jurisprudence of the formal economy as it is
altered by traces of dynamic jurisprudence. Without these traces, the jurisprudence of the formal economy
would be entirely static, and the formal jurisprudence would be identical to static jurisprudence.
6. The jurisprudence of the informal economy may be distinguished from other well-explored ideas.
First, norms need not be reflected in formal jurisprudence in order to govern effectively. See JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 243 (1990); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4-6, 137-55 (1991); NV. Michael Reisman, Lining Up: The Microlegal
System of Queues, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 417 (1985); W. Michael Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring:
Microlegal Systems and the Public Order, 12 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 165 (1983). Second, norms can
govern effectively even when they conflict with formal jurisprudence. See ELLICKSON, supra, at 141-43;
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 82-83 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi
trans., 1989) (1933); Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identifi-
cation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1776-87 (1992); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Walter 0. Weyrauch & Maureen A.
Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323, 360-67 (1993). Third,
formal jurisprudence can borrow norms when they are already effective. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The
First Struggle To Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939) (examining interchange between merchant
practice and merchant law).
The norms envisioned in these three ideas supplement formal jurisprudence, but are nonetheless
fundamentally indifferent to it. They complement, and cooperate or conflict with formal jurisprudence,
because they work beside it in the same territory, just as federal law works beside state law, and religious
law beside secular law. See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM (1975);
Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary
American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 830-31 (1993). The informal economy's supplement to
formal jurisprudence is of a different order. It is a dangerous supplement. See CULLER, supra note 4, at
103-07; Balkin, supra note 4, at 758-61. See generally DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS: RESISTANCE AND
RENEWAL IN JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1991). The norms of the informal economy are not
indifferent to formal jurisprudence, but always threaten to unsettle it. Furthermore, these norms flourish
only in estrangement from the state. Proximity to the state masks or suppresses them.
7. For a proposal that formal jurisprudence ought to include "destabilization rights," see ROBERTO
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEmENT 39 (1986). These are exactly the rights the informal
economy contributes to formal jurisprudence.
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daily to arbitrage between formal and informal. Nevertheless, common law is
under siege in our administrative state, and though powerful champions defend
it,' common law has not firmly seized an intellectual place among the
jurisprudences. It is tempting to attribute this failure to the common lawyers'
hard-boiled anti-intellectualism. A more likely explanation is that the jurispru-
dences with which the common law is affiliated are strange ones, alien to the
main traditions of Western academic jurisprudence. It is to this other path of
the law that I shall now devote attention.
I.
Although the distinction between the formal and informal economy
belongs to social science, it is a distinction with jurisprudential significance.
The formal sector organizes around a state-oriented, or static, jurisprudence;
the informal economy, around a state-avoiding, or dynamic, one. To see the
jurisprudential significance of the distinction between the formal and informal
economy, it is first necessary to find a criterion, or definition, for sorting
transactions across the boundary between formal and informal.9 The boundary
between these two realms can be demarcated by determining whether the
parties to a transaction orient themselves to applying a rule they expect a judge
could apply in the event of a dispute.
A. Boundary Criteria in Social Science
Social scientists have typically tried to define the boundary between the
formal and informal economies by focusing on the informal economy.
However, this effort represents only half the struggle, since only by defining
the formal economy as well can we fully address the jurisprudential
implications of these activities.
A social anthropologist, Keith Hart, proposed the term "informal sector"
in 1973. He used it to criticize an assumption in development economics that
official surveys of employment in African cities accurately measured income-
earning activities. Hart suggested that only "enterprises run with some measure
of bureaucracy are amenable to enumeration by surveys."'" He put enterprises
8. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION].
9. On boundary maintenance, see Talcott Parsons et al., Values, Motives, and Systems of Action, in
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 108-09 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils eds., 1951)
(boundary maintenance in sociology); Cover, supra note 5, at 31; Al Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory:
Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 383 (1979); Louis M. Seidman, Public
Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987).
10. Keith Hart, Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, II J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 61, 68 (1973).
2216 [Vol. 103: 2213
Jacobson
not amenable to enumeration in the "informal sector." "The key variable," he
wrote, "is the degree of rationalisation of work-that is to say, whether or not
labour is recruited on a permanent and regular basis for fixed rewards.""
Once social scientists applied Hart's insight to developed countries,
reference to law was inevitable. The informal sector in developed countries
also includes enterprises missed by surveys because owners wish to escape
regulation, not because work in them has not been rationalized. Thus, in a
1987 paper urging attention to the informal sector in western market
economies, Alejandro Portes and Saskia Sassen-Koob tentatively defined the
informal sector "as the sum total of income-earning activities with the
exclusion of those that involve contractual and legally regulated
employment."' 2 Their definition includes enterprises fleeing regulation, but
does not delineate the boundaries of contract and legal regulation. Setting these
boundaries is one of the more difficult problems of legal doctrine and
theory. 3
B. Boundary Criteria in Law
State-oriented jurisprudence offers two devices, legal formalism and legal
formality, for maintaining a boundary between law and competing social
processes. While these devices facilitate the self-maintenance of the legal
system as an autonomous social subsystem, 14 they make unsustainable
assumptions about the nature of action and the relationship between intention
and action. Therefore, legal formalism and legal formality are unworkable
criteria. Nonetheless, a careful examination of formalism and formality does
point to a third formulation that might prove a helpful boundary criterion. The
search for this third definition must begin by revealing the arduous and
11. Id. Hart's definition had three aims. The cognitive aim was to criticize the accuracy of econometric
methods as applied to developing economies. He thus focused on the economic incidents of employment,
making no reference to law. The policy aim was to caution governments and lending institutions that
channeling funds only in directions suggested by data about enumerable enterprises is not necessarily good
policy. The ideological aim was to question the Marxist assumption that the informal sector in developing
economies is a lagging sector of "petty capitalists," a remnant of imperialist exploitation marginal to
development.
12. Alejandro Portes & Saskia Sassen-Koob, Making It Underground: Comparative Material on the
Informal Sector in Western Market Economies, 93 AM. J. Soc. 30, 31 (1987).
13. Contracts teachers, such as myself, love boundary questions. Doctrines respecting contract
formation are an obvious beginning. From there we travel to parol evidence, inadequate consideration, and
beyond. See, e.g., Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928) (parol evidence); Fischer v. Union Trust Co.,
101 N.W. 852 (Mich. 1904) (inadequate consideration). For an effort to avoid the boundary question, see
the definition of "informal economy" in Manuel Castells & Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The
Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN
ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 11-12 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989).
14. Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1647, 1662-63, 1677 (1989) (criticizing idea of a legal subsystem) [hereinafter Jacobson, Autopoietic Law];
Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (1992). See generally AUTOPOIETIc LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND
SOCIETY (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) [hereinafter AuToPOimTC LAW].
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unrealistic assumptions of these two approaches, legal formalism and legal
formality.
Legal formalism describes a condition under which it is possible to tell in
advance a rule's range of application. The condition is that those responsible
for administering a rule, principally judges, apply it "mechanically."' 5
Mechanical application assumes that the rule refers unambiguously to a well-
defined action. This assumption depends, in turn, on our ability to define
actions with complete accuracy at a given moment. The rule then serves as a
mark or tag for action.
One challenge to the boundary suggested by formalism comes from within
the logic of the legal system. Formalism supplies a criterion, if at all, only
when judges scrupulously adhere to it. Surely it is possible to imagine a legal
system whose judges are faithful to formalism. 6 But that is not our system,
and even if it were, the success of formalism would always be open to
question. Suppose, in any case, a system that did not run along formalist lines.
The formal economy set up by such a system would be no less formal to both
lawyers and social scientists. Even lawyers who reject formalism regard tasks
they perform as "formal."' 7 It is hard to imagine them propounding a doctrine
of "legal informalism."' 8  A second challenge to formalism's boundary
criterion comes from outside the legal system. Society refutes the assumption
of well-defined action. The economic and moral costs of insisting that actions
be made so are too great for tolerant societies to bear. Even if actions were
well-defined, the complexity of fashioning rules to tag them would be intolera-
ble.' 9 The cost of incessantly searching for rules would far exceed the
economic or moral benefit of sustaining formalism.
20
Legal formality, by contrast, dispenses with well-defined action, and with
rules as marks or tags. It sets the boundary of the legal system by means other
than the range of application of rules. A formality allows people to signal that
they wish to subject a transaction to some sort of legal process.2 ' That
15. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 351, 359 (1973). But see Ernest J.
Weinreb, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 583 (1993)
(mechanical application of rules as caricature of formalism). Roberto Unger has suggested that formalism
is one end of a spectrum shared by all approaches. UNGER, supra note 7, at 1-2.
16. So even Jacques Derrida supposes. See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation
of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 921, 961-63 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
17. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 141
(1994) ("The law wishes to have a formal existence.").
18. Lawyers may be willing to claim they are "anti-formalist," but not that they are "informalists." The
only exception I know is the acknowledgement of an informal administrative process.
19. Compare Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (urging caution in framing standards
of behavior that amount to rules of law) (Cardozo, J.) with Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275
U.S. 66 (1927) ("[WMhen the standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts.") (Holmes,
J.).
20. The deregulation movement is a response to this calculus. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
21. The seal and the memorandum in the Statute of Frauds are examples. See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTh, CONTRACTS 86-88, 426-34 (2d ed. 1990).
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process often is, but need not be, the one described by formalism. The
boundary of the legal system is established by election to use the formality.
Formality thus marks transactions for subjection to the legal system, whereas
formalism marks actions with rules for imposition of the legal system on
transactions.
Though formality does not make assumptions as arduous as those of
formalism, it too fails to establish a coherent boundary criterion. Formality
establishes two versions of the criterion, not one. In the first, the parties'
intention to subject a transaction to legal process establishes the boundary. In
the second, the boundary is established by the expression of their intention in
a formality. In order to produce the same boundary, intention to subject a
transaction to legal process must always be perfectly expressed in the formali-
ty. However, parties may use a formality without intending to subject a
transaction to the legal system. They may, for example, execute a contract
without ever intending to sue should one of them breach.22 Participants in
criminal syndicates and consumers of low breach-cost products or services
execute such contracts. Also, parties who have used a formality may fail to
persuade a judge to subject a transaction to legal process, or a judge might
decide to subject it to legal process even when parties have failed to use the
formality properly.
Moreover, the boundaries suggested by formalism and formality wrongly
assume that the legal system sets the boundary on its own, without interference
by other social processes. Yet it is exactly this assumption that the informal
economy challenges. Nevertheless, formalism and formality can suggest a
workable approach, once we relax their disabling assumptions.
C. A Workable Boundary Criterion
A transaction is in the formal economy when parties to the transaction
orient themselves towards applying a rule that they expect, in principle, a judge
could apply if asked to resolve a dispute over the transaction. Likewise, a
transaction belongs in the informal economy when parties do not orient
themselves towards applying a rule that way. This is the boundary established
by formalism and formality, shorn of assumptions.'
22. See, e.g., New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Corp., 34 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1929)
(describing sham transaction); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Professor Macaulay's conclusions are even more
compelling in light of alternative dispute resolution.
23. The central proposition of formalism is that it is possible to tell in advance a rule's range of
application. For the proposition to be valid, judges must agree to apply rules in a certain way, and actions
tagged by rules must be well defined. By broadening "application" to include parties as well as judges so
that parties participate in application, the parties can then tell in advance a rule's range of application in
the course of carrying out the transaction. The central proposition of formality is that parties may signal
their desire to subject a transaction to the legal process by a formality. For the proposition to be valid,
parties must be able to express their intentions perfectly in that formality. However, by refashioning
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A party orients behavior towards applying a rule when he or she indicates,
by speech or deed, that the rule is to be a motivation for action.24 Parties may
pick the "wrong" rule in that the judge does not use it, but orientation does,
nonetheless, define a boundary. The parties carry on as if they are on the
formal side of the boundary. So long as they sustain that orientation, they
remain there. The only limitation on the class of rules is that parties must
expect that, in principle, a judge could apply a rule, not that the judge does or
would apply it at some moment in the unfolding of the transaction.
The boundary established by the criterion, "orientation towards applying
a rule," relegates many of the same transactions discussed in social science
literature to the informal sector. These include criminal enterprise, off-the-
books business, and employment of undocumented aliens. In none of these
transactions do parties orient behavior towards applying a rule, either imposed
on them by the state, or supplied by them to the state in the form of contract.
However, the criterion proposed here assigns far more transactions than
these to the informal side of the boundary. Any transaction in which parties do
not orient behavior towards applying a rule they expect could be applied by a
judge must be labelled informal. Contracts implied-in-law are an example.'s
Mechanisms of private enforcement-by private judges, settlement, mediation,
grievance procedures-are informal to the degree that participants do not orient
themselves towards applying a rule.26 Intra-firm practices and processes are
informal in the dual sense that they lack requisite formality, and the
participants ordinarily do not orient themselves towards applying rules they
expect to form the basis of judicial application. Merchant clubs, such as the
diamond bourse, sponsor complete transactional informality.27 Trade associa-
tions, cartels, and the like may provide forums for illegal or quasi-legal
exchanges of information, agreements not to compete, informal standards, and
other activity not oriented towards rules the parties expect to serve as the basis
for judicial application.
Transactions may be part formal, part informal. Criminal enterprises, for
example, must ultimately surface in the formal economy, whether by renting
"formality" to include any application of a rule, that application signals subjection to legal process and
creates a perfect coincidence between intention and expression.
24. On the sociological concept of "orientation" see Parsons et al., supra note 9, at 67-76. One
example of a complexity that can arise is where one party is oriented towards the application of a rule,
while the other is not.
25. Stewart Macaulay's work on informal contract administration suggests another. Macaulay, supra
note 22; see also Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (examining nongovernmental repeat-purchase mechanism of
contract enforcement). A contract the state may not enforce would be on the formal side of the boundary,
so long as parties to the contract orient themselves towards applying a rule.
26. ELLICKSON, supra note 6, at 52-64. See generally Symposium, Private Alternatives to the Judicial
Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (1979).
27. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). Inasmuch as the diamond bourse replaces the state as the
correlating agency, it is a parallel formal system.
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premises, investing funds in legitimate businesses, or other formal transactions.
Enterprises may choose to document illegal or quasi-legal transactions
formally. Courts in the United States may, in an appropriate case, enforce a
contract against public policy, even one with an illegal provision. 8 Even
undocumented aliens have rights in the work place-suing in tort, for example,
for a job-related injury.29
Also, the boundary between formal and informal is uncertain and shifting.
Bodies of law nominally in the jurisprudence of the formal economy (the
Uniform Commercial Code is a prominent example) can remit parties to
informal norms, such as a course of dealing or customs of the trade.3" Parties
may not know whether a course of dealing, custom or practice has ripened to
become part of the formal jurisprudence, and if it has, whether it remains
there. Even if a practice has been formalized, there is some uncertainty
whether it will be applied to a marginal participant in the practice.3'
It is important to emphasize, as well, that society as a whole engages in
a constant exchange of formalization and deformalization. "Going private" is
a decision by owners or managers to withdraw corporate processes from
aspects of the formal legal system. Legislators deformalize an activity when
they decriminalize it. Antenuptial agreements formalize informal family
practices. Sexual harassment policies formalize private relations in the work
place.
The boundary between the formal and informal economies marks the
boundary of a jurisprudence, rather than the range of effective regulation by
the state. The jurisprudence of the formal economy-static jurisprudence-is
oriented towards the state, whereas the jurisprudence of the informal
economy--dynamic jurisprudence-relies on more diffuse mechanisms for
enforcement. We now must turn to the principles animating these jurispru-
dences.
II.
Just as the formal and informal economies reflect two divergent sets of
expectations about the role of rules in transactions, static and dynamic
28. See Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 743-44 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[C]ontract defense of illegality is flexible rather than rigid .... ).
29. See, e.g., Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted and rev'd on other
grounds, Rojas v. Richardson, 713 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983).
30. See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1989); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (urging custom as conclusive evidence of due care in cases arising out of a consensual
arrangement). Because the lines between formal and informal are so fluid in the U.C.C., it is easy to argue
that informal norms are formal. The real test is not what "we" say, but the orientation of parties.
31. Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1979)
(party is bound by a trade usage only if he either knows or has reason to know of its existence and nature);
see also Epstein, supra note 30, at 5.
1994] 2221
The Yale Law Journal
jurisprudence summarize two orientations towards the operation of law.32 The
key difference between static and dynamic jurisprudence is that in static
jurisprudence rights and duties are expected always to be in correlation, while
in dynamic jurisprudence, they are not. Static jurisprudence, the jurisprudence
of the formal economy, thus always assumes the presence of an agency
supervising correlations, to which persons can have recourse should they be
unable to ensure that their rights or duties are respected.33 Hence, when
parties use static jurisprudence, they orient their behavior towards a rule that
establishes a correlation. The agency is commonly, but not necessarily, the
state. Dynamic jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the informal economy,
rejects the presence of a correlation-maintaining agency. Indeed, it breaks
correlations. When parties use dynamic jurisprudence, they do not orient their
behavior towards a rule that establishes a correlation. Actors in the informal
economy are governed by radically different principles, and these principles
fuel dynamic jurisprudence. The distinction between breaking and maintaining
correlations leads, in turn, to characteristic and contrasting stances on the
nature of norms, the role of persons in the jurisprudence, and the structure of
legal institutions.34
The logic supporting each stance, static and dynamic, organizes
jurisprudence into five model positions. Static jurisprudence can be broken
down into the positions of positivism and naturalism; dynamic jurisprudence,
into the jurisprudence of right, jurisprudence of duty, and common law. Each
position is always available in any practicing legal system, and each can serve
as the root, or starting point, of a legal system. Once a legal system begins to
operate according to one of the models, the others present challenges-hard
cases, dilemmas, paradoxes, marginal doctrines, and silent practices. The root
position then integrates a response, which is then subject to further challenges.
32. The logic of static jurisprudence is well known. The logic of dynamic jurisprudence, though it
undergirds professional legal activity in the United States, is not often recognized in legal theory. Kelsen
was the first to discuss "static and dynamic legal theory." HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 70-71
(Max Knight trans., 1967). He proposed a hierarchy of norms, in which following a norm dynamically
generates inferior norms. Id. at 221-78. Llewellyn insisted that common law could not be squared with
static models. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 6, at 184-91. Cover introduced the
dynamic jurisprudence of duty into American legal literature. Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurispru-
dence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987); see also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in
Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1961).
33. Hohfeld uses "correlations" in his table of judicial conceptions. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36
(1923).
34. Static and dynamic jurisprudence also take characteristic and contrasting positions on the
relationship between consciousness and law, between written and oral law, between community and person,
as well as on the role of time in jurisprudence, the nature of language, and the structure of legal rationality.
See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idea of a Legal Unconscious, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1473 (1992); Arthur J.
Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law According to Moses, with Reference to Other Jurisprudences,
11 CARDOzO L. REv. 1079 (1990); Jacobson, Autopoietic Law, supra note 14, at 1681-87; Arthur J.
Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 877 (1989) [hereinafter Jacobson, Hegel's Legal
Plenum].
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Root, challenge, response, integration, further challenge-this process yields
an endless variety of practicing legal systems. Nevertheless, the roots available
to a legal system are distinct and enumerable, each coherent and sufficient on
its own terms.
A. Static Jurisprudence
Correlation-maintaining jurisprudence has four chief characteristics. First,
its norms are static in that it is possible to describe precisely the entire norma-
tive constitution of the legal universe at a single moment, and persons can
fulfill the basic conditions of legality without changing that legal structure.
While new or additional norms can be produced through legislation, it is
always an extraordinary event in this jurisprudence. Second, the source of
norms in static jurisprudence, as expressed in either positivism or naturalism,
is always outside the legal system. In positivism, the source is a procedure for
marking norms as legally valid. In naturalism, the source is rational
observation by a qualified observer. Operation of the legal system by itself
never determines the content of norms. Instead, content is always drawn from
outside the legal system. 35 Third, law in static jurisprudence does not fill the
normative universe. Many socially effective norms are neither marked by a
positivist procedure, nor perceived as law by a qualified naturalist observer.
Static jurisprudence tolerates or expects comers of the normative universe to
be legally unregulated.36 Fourth, static jurisprudence is organized into two
root positions, according to whether the jurisprudence emphasizes legislation
(the position of positivism) or enforcement (the position of naturalism).
While legislation in static jurisprudence is always separate from
enforcement, the two forms of static jurisprudence, positivism and naturalism,
may be distinguished according to the emphases they place on enforcement and
legislation. Positivism reduces enforcement to the smallest possible role in the
legal system by relying on self-enforcement-"efficacy" in Hans Kelsen's
language7--and formalist accounts of judging. Positivism assigns the state
the role of marking norms as authoritative rules for allocating correlative rights
35. In positivism, content is determined by the arbitrary will of whoever controls the procedure. Thus,
content is always political. In naturalism, a qualified observer perceives content as nature. In both
positivism and naturalism, legal personality plays no role in determining content. What persons do to get
control of a positivist procedure, or what they do with it, owes nothing to personality. They wield the
procedure as a club. Similarly, rational observation in naturalism is always an automatic consequence of
qualification, owing nothing to personality. Content is observed in nature. Observation takes place from
within the legal system, but what is observed is outside. Hence, the legal system takes responsibility for
qualifying observation, but not for normative content.
36. The existence of norms rejected or neglected by static jurisprudence poses a moral challenge to
static norms; positivists criticize existing static norms, whereas naturalists question the qualifications of the
existing naturalist rulers.
37. HANs KEtsEn, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 41-42, 118-19 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945).
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and duties. The marking instrument is always a procedure, whether legislative
process, the will of the monarch impressed by a seal, or methods of divination.
Positivism takes various positions on the origin of the procedure. H.L.A. Hart,
for example, follows John Austin,38 by looking to the fact of acceptance.39
Thomas Hobbes supposes that the procedure originates in agreement.4"
Procedures can originate in nature, or in divine fiat. Whatever the origin,
positivism looks to some authoritative procedure to mark norms as rules for
allocating correlative rights and duties.
Naturalism, in principle, eliminates legislation-the production of novel
norms-altogether from the jurisprudence. The only operation of the legal
system is enforcement of rules for allocating the correlative rights and duties
that a qualified observer perceives. The state's role is to declare who is
qualified. Just as positivism must account for the origins of the procedure,
naturalism must decide how persons become qualified, relying, for example,
on election, natural marks or signs, examination, birth in the right family, or
acclamation. Almost universally, the role of rendering an authoritative
declaration in naturalist jurisprudence is assigned to a state apparatus. The state
apparatus resorts, in turn, to a positivist procedure for marking declarations as
authoritative. Similarly, all versions of positivism require a qualified observer
to see that the procedure has been correctly followed, and that the procedure,
however arrived at, is proper. Thus, positivism always depends on a version
of naturalism to stabilize operation of the procedure. In other words, positivism
and naturalism are two sides of a single approach to jurisprudence, in which
responsibility for supervising the allocation of correlative rights and duties
through rules, however it is done, is assigned to a state apparatus. Most
contemporary jurisprudence reflects the state-orientation of positivism and
naturalism, mixing the two in a virtually unlimited variety of proportions and
combinations.
Violence in static jurisprudence is always external to the inner logic of
norms and monopolized by a specific agency. Thus, static jurisprudence always
has norms for sanctions that are separate from norms for liability, and a
violation of a substantive norm does not necessarily lead to a sanction. This
existence of a separate set of norms for sanctions is what allows a correlating
agency to claim a monopoly of violence. Otherwise, ordinary persons could
exercise violence in self-help as part of following substantive norms. Positivists
enforce norms like ranchers herd cattle: They nudge, they fence if they can,
but if not, they use nastier forms of violence. Violence is the moral or physical
force necessary to make persons follow norms. In naturalism, the course of
nature is understood to impose its own autonomous violence. However, a
38. JOHN AUSTIN, LEcTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 220-24
(Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885) (discussing "habit of obedience" to sovereign).
39. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEFr OF LAW 105 (1961).
40. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 117-29 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651).
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correlating agency may exercise violence in order to cure or eliminate a
disorder of nature.41
B. Dynamic Jurisprudence
Dynamic jurisprudence rejects the role of an agency supervising
correlations in either the positivist or naturalist manner. There are three root
positions of dynamic jurisprudence: the jurisprudence of right, the
jurisprudence of duty, and common law. These root positions share many
fundamental characteristics. First, norms in correlation-breaking jurisprudence
are dynamic, making it impossible to describe the legal universe fully at any
one moment. Second, the source of norms in dynamic jurisprudence is always
inside the legal system. Although the three sorts of dynamic jurisprudence
place the source differently, the source can always be found in ordinary
interactions between parties. Third, the normative universe of dynamic
jurisprudence is a full legal universe. Persons strive to fill it with as much law
as possible. However, the legal universe can never be entirely full, since the
basic obligation of legality is constantly to create or transform normative
material. The legal universe is always in a state of being filled. There are no
legally empty corners. Fourth, legislation and enforcement are never separated.
Norms are always legislated in enforcement, and never enforced without
producing legislation. Because enforcement never appears as such, dynamic
jurisprudence uses forms of violence less obvious than static forms of violence.
These forms of violence may be understood only within the logic of each
dynamic jurisprudence.
In the jurisprudence of right, duty is eliminated or suppressed. Recourse
to duty is always a mark of failure. Persons want rights, not because they want
to use them (they may well), but because having rights expresses legal digni-
ty.a2 For example, both the publisher of the New York Times and I have the
right to freedom of the press. Although I do not own a press, the right is as
important to me as it is to the publisher-no more, no less.43 The fact that he
uses the right and I do not is of no legal significance. We are persons of equal
legal dignity, because we both have the right. Recognition is always mutual,
always in the form of right, and the drive for it is incessant, leading to quests
for recognition from ever wider circles of persons. Additionally, the drive for
41. AuToPOITIC LAW, supra note 14, at 1656.
42. "Separate but equal" treats equal rights as if it were a matter of equal facilities, having nothing
to do with dignity. The struggle of nonphysician counselors in New York for the physician-patient privilege
is an example of the passion for dignity. When enacted in 1962, the Civil Practice Law and Rules adopted
the common law privilege for physicians. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4504 (McKinney 1992). It added
psychologists in 1968 (§ 4507), social workers also in 1968 (§ 4508), and rape crisis counselors in 1994
(§ 4510).
43. Similarly, the press has no greater right of access to trials than the public. See Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-94 (1979).
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recognition has an erotic component, since one seeks recognition only from
persons with whom one has an attachment or for whom one cares or loves.'
Because recognition must always be mutual, the rationality between persons
is one of exchange where the vision of community is one of honest property
owners, engaged jointly in recognizing and defending their property in
common.
45
The jurisprudence of duty eliminates right entirely. It is a jurisprudence
constructed entirely out of duties. Thus, I do not bring another person to court
because I assert a right, but because it is my duty to help or to make the other
person fulfill his or her duty. Judges do not resolve disputes; rather, they
declare duties. All jurisdiction in this jurisprudence is mandatory. Judges have
the duty, not the power, to declare duties. Persons want duties in this
jurisprudence because they wish to emulate a perfect legal person. The perfect
person in the jurisprudence of duty provides a model to emulate, an ideal
commander who has specifically legal virtues. The virtues may be those of a
god, a founder, or a hero. The virtues are never the result of legal process, but
call instead for its initiation. Because the ideal commander is itself a
personality, hence always in process, emulation requires the constant creation
and recreation of legal materials. Ideally, persons are partners of the com-
mander in a joint enterprise of legal perfection. Therefore, rationality is not
purely one of exchange but of a partnership dedicated to emulating the perfect
legal person.
Common law eliminates neither right nor duty, but insists on incessant
unsettlement and resettlement of correlations. It is a dynamic jurisprudence that
calls on the state to transform correlations in concert with persons. Common
law's approach to norms is that law is just application. It realizes this approach
in three stages. In the first, persons learn law by reading cases, the record of
prior applications. The reading is always oriented towards application to the
case at hand, never a reading without orientation. In the second stage, persons
learn more about the law as they plan action and then act in light of their
reading. The norm itself changes as persons act. Norms in the first stage are
necessarily general. They become calculable and specific in the course of
application. They also differ from norms generated in prior applications.
Persons cannot know a norm fully before they have generated it in action. But
44. This erotic character has also been alluded to by Ronald Dworkin, who describes "a natural right
of all men and women to equality of concern and respect." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
182 (1978). I use the term "erotic" in the classical sense of Plato and Freud to include all drives and
activities by which individuals help produce and reproduce the species. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATIONS
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1961); PLATO, SYMPOSIUM, *189-93 (describing reintegration of original human
nature).
45. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Of course, Professors Epstein
and Nozick would vigorously deny that their rational social arrangements have anything to do with love.
That is because they have a naturalist version of the jurisprudence of right that muscles its erotic
component.
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common law needs a third stage. The norm generated in the second stage
cannot be known fully until it too serves as an application for a future
application. The process continues ad infinitum. The rationality of the system
depends on achieving calculability of norms through interaction. 6
For each of the three forms of dynamic jurisprudence, the source of norms
is always inside the legal system, in ordinary interaction. In the jurisprudence
of duty, which breaks the correlation of right with duty by entirely eliminating
right, the source of norms is a perfect legal person that the community seeks
to emulate. In the jurisprudence of right, which breaks the correlation by
suppressing duty, the source of norms is the striving of persons for mutual
recognition through rights-for legal dignity. Common law eliminates neither
right nor duty, but breaks their correlation by constantly unsettling and
resettling past correlations. Thus, the source of norms in common law can only
be the transformation of norms in specific applications by two or more persons
linked together through the process of application.
Just as violence in static jurisprudence consists of action by a state agency
to enforce a correlation of rights with duties, dynamic jurisprudence is
characterized by forms of violence as well. These forms of violence are not
monopolized by the state but represent the logical continuation of the particular
normative framework. In the jurisprudence of right, violence is the loss of
legal dignity: withdrawal of recognition, its attendant emotional consequences,
and the loss of the promise of protection that flows from recognition. Violence
in the jurisprudence of duty turns a person who has failed to fulfill a duty into
a nonperson by means of banishment.47 In common law, violence initially
takes the form of legal uncertainty-inability to achieve applications of law in
concert with other persons. If uncertainty persists and is grave enough to
warrant resort to state assistance, common law uses forms of violence
employed by static jurisprudence.
C. Two Cases of Dynamic Jurisprudence
Because the correlating agency is also keeper of records, publisher of
reports, and compiler of static norms, examples of dynamic
jurisprudence-exactly the jurisprudence for which the record-keeper, report-
publisher and norm-compiler is not responsible-do not abound in legal
literature. We see traces of dynamic jurisprudence in formal jurisprudence, but,
46. Habermas uses the word Rechtsgenossen, which William Rehg translates as "equal and free
consociates under law." JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACrS AND NoRMs (William Rehg trans.,
forthcoming 1994) (manuscript on file with author). Rational persons interact so as to make hard cases
easy. Cf. Marci A. Hamilton, Book Review, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1993) ("[E]asy cases are
only easy in retrospect.").
47. For descriptions of Jewish Law as a jurisprudence of duty, see Cover, supra note 32, at 65-68;
Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, supra note 34, at 892-95; Stone, supra note 6, at 865-72. Suzanne Stone
has argued that Robert Cover underestimated the role of violence in Jewish Law. Id. at 871-72.
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as we shall see, these traces are easily masked by static perspectives. It is now
possible to find dynamic jurisprudence in a pure form, not just as traces,
because legal ethnographers have begun to examine legal systems that use
western notions of right and duty.48
Consider an obvious case. In his celebrated study of the political economy
of the informal sector in Peru, The Other Path,49 Hernando de Soto describes
the "extralegal norms" created by laborers in the informal economy, known as
informals, to govern their work and home life." These norms must work
substantially, but not entirely, without recourse to the coercive threat that
remains, in principle, a monopoly of the state. De Soto's work is rich with data
validating the intuition that persons without access to a correlating agency will
either make their own, informal correlating agency5' or form communities
according to principles of dynamic jurisprudence. De Soto's study shows that
Peru's informal sector in the early 1980's reflected both possibilities.
Informal housing provides an excellent case in point. De Soto describes
communities formed around an "invasion contract," whereby a group of
informals agree to occupy government or private land.52 Invasions can be
gradual or violent.5 3 The "contract," de Soto reports, ideally lacks formality,
since it depends on the free consent of the parties. 4 De Soto describes the
gradual growth of what he calls an "expectative property right" once informals
have invaded land.55 This right depends, initially, on the mutual recognition
of parties to the invasion contract, first established by appearance before the
community56 and then in informal property registers maintained by
community organizations.57 Withdrawal of recognition and expulsion from the
48. Robert Cover devotes much of Nomos and Narrative to a description of groups practicing a
jurisprudence of duty. Cover, supra note 6, at 26-35. Such groups are common enough in a tolerant society.
The jurisprudence of right, though, slips under the radar. For all our preoccupation with rights, we always
see them in terms of what we shall discover in Part III is only their trace in the formal jurisprudence: the
doctrine of individual rights. Cover himself wrongly associated rights with static jurisprudence. Cover,
supra note 32, at 68-73.
49. DE SOTO, supra note 2. Despite the significance of de Soto's work for policy and theory, it has
received little attention in legal literature. Two noteworthy exceptions are Peter H. Schuck & Robert E.
Litan, Regulatory Reform in the Third World: The Case of Peru, 4 YALE J. REG. 51 (1986), and Jane K.
Winn, How To Make Poor Countries Rich and How To Enrich Our Poor, 77 IOWA L. REV. 899 (1992)
(reviewing DE SOTO, supra note 2).
50. DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 19.
51. Nothing prevents informals from developing their own static jurisprudence, if they can. In the
United States, it would be interesting to compare the level of violence employed by organized crime with
that of the state. This comparison would require distinguishing random, anomic killings-as much a product
of the formal economy as the informal-from informal "executions," as well as recognizing the inability
of organized crime to lock people up. Organized crime's level of static violence may prove to be compara-
ble to that of the state.
52. DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 22-23.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id. at 23.
55. Id. at 23-26.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 28.
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community is one penalty for criminal behavior.58 But participants in an inva-
sion seek wider recognition for their expectative property right, and, in
particular, recognition from the state.5 9 As the participants achieve wider
recognition, they can transfer the property rights directly, as an ordinary
transfer of legal title, without needing recognition by community organiza-
tions.60
De Soto describes all but one of the elements of a dynamic jurisprudence
of right: demand for recognition, exchange of recognition, drive for wider
recognition, and withdrawal of recognition.6' He does not report material on
the erotic character of recognition. An economist, de Soto attributes the drive
for recognition to efficiency and profit. Legally recognized property is, on
average, nine times more valuable than informal property of equivalent quali-
ty.62 Occupants of informal housing may or may not love each other, but they
certainly want the profits flowing from wider recognition of the expectative
property right.
To validate the role of the erotic character of the dynamic jurisprudence
of right we must turn to a less obvious case of rights-based jurisprudence:
Robert Ellickson's account of relations among rural landowners in Shasta
County, California.63 Ellickson reports that the landowners he studied knew
little about the formal laws governing damages for cattle trespass,
responsibility for fence maintenance, and liability for the collision of
automobiles with stray cattle. He also reports that what they do know, they
ignore. Instead, the landowners have developed informal norms to govern
rights and duties for cattle trespass and fence maintenance, and persist in their
ignorance about the formal law governing collisions.
Ellickson derives the content of these norms from a rational-actor model,
in which people pursue self-interested goals and rationally choose among
various means for achieving those goals.64 Using techniques developed in
game theory, Ellickson's model elegantly predicts that the landowners would
ignore the formal law governing cattle trespass and fence maintenance. His
model also predicts an overarching norm of neighborliness, and the content of
subsidiary norms governing cattle trespass and fence maintenance. His
hypothesis is that members of a close-knit group, such as the landowners in
Shasta County, "develop and maintain norms whose content serves to
58. Id. at 29.
59. Id. at 33-55.
60. Id. at 25.
61. The other response is the jurisprudence of duty, which is the likely province of the political and
social movement that was and is in competition with de Soto's informals-the Shining Path.
62. DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 24.
63. ELLICKSON, supra note 6.
64. Id. at 156-58. Needless to say, Ellickson's description of informal norms in Shasta County is a
naturalist supplement to formal jurisprudence. Ellickson observes the rational content of norms that the
landowners derive "by drawing upon general cultural traditions, role models, or personal habits developed
after trial-and-error experimentations." Id. at 157.
19941 2229
The Yale Law Journal
maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs
with one another."'65 A norm is welfare-maximizing, he says, "when it
promises to minimize the members' objective sum of (1) transaction costs and
(2) deadweight losses arising from failures to exploit potential gains from
trade.",66 Ellickson finds that the cattle-trespass norms and boundary fencing
norms vindicate his hypothesis.67 The Shasta County landowners act
rationally.
By persisting in their ignorance about collision cases, however, they do not
act rationally according to Ellickson's model. Cattlemen believe that they are
strictly liable for the collision losses in closed range, but that motorists are
strictly liable in open range.68 In reality, both formal law69 and the insurance
companies70 tend to treat closed and open range the same. The cattlemen's
belief leads traditionalists among them, who do not graze cattle on fenced
tracts,71 to drop summer grazing leases on unfenced tracts near newly closed
areas, presumably in favor of less desirable tracts.72 This is irrational. Their
belief also leads traditionalist cattlemen to oppose closing the range. This too
is irrational, albeit less costly. Even more irrational are the modernist
cattlemen, who do graze cattle on fenced tracts,73 but join traditionalists in
opposition to closing the range. 74 Why do cattlemen persist in opposition?
Ellickson's rational-actor model cannot explain the cattlemen's behavior
in collision cases. Indeed, Ellickson says almost nothing about collision cases
in the rational-actor part of the book. Instead, he mounts three explanations
from social science to explain the cattlemen's irrationality in collision cases:
symbolic politics, cognitive dissonance, and costly markets for information.
But these explanations are all exogenous to the rational-actor model. While
compelling from the perspective of social science, the cattlemen's
"irrationality" is consistent with a jurisprudential explanation, which
Ellickson's data implicitly confirms. These cattlemen care so much about
closing the range because it symbolizes a threat to their way of life,75 which
they love.7 6 The cattlemen recognize each other as having a special legal
dignity-the dignity of their occupation. They seek to protect that dignity, and
are driven, against Ellickson's rational norms, to gain wider recognition for it.
65. Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 184.
67. Id. at 185-89.
68. Id. at 82-83.
69. Id. at 87-93.
70. Id. at 95-97; see id. at 115 ("[C]attlemen repeatedly get reports that insurance companies and
courts have not followed the adage that 'the motorist buys the cow in open range."').
71. Id. at 22-24.
72. Id. at 104, 110-13.
73. Id. at 24-25.
74. Id. at 30-39, 115.
75. Id. at 116-17.
76. Id. at 25 ("[M]embers of both groups [modernists and traditionalists] believe that the life of the
cattleman is the best possible in western America.").
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Ellickson's model perfectly predicts the cattlemen's persistence in informality,
but it does not tell us everything they do there. Ellickson's rational-actor model
gets it right for trespass and fence disputes, but not for collision cases. The
logic of the jurisprudence of right, otherwise consistent with Ellickson's model,
explains why the cattlemen behave irrationally.7
These are the logics of static and dynamic jurisprudence. The formal
economy uses static jurisprudence and is governed by its logic. The informal
economy uses dynamic jurisprudence and is governed by its logic. Common
law bridges the gap between static and dynamic jurisprudence, between the
formal and informal economy. It gives the state a dynamic role, unsettling and
resettling correlations. A common law system routes all norms through the
informal process-and applies norms nominally outside the legal system. The
life history of every norm has informal, as well as formal, moments.
III.
Though any jurisprudence may, in principle, serve as the root position of
a legal system, nations are not free to choose legal systems as Paris picks
fashions. Culture, economics, and politics favor one form of jurisprudence over
another.7" It is hard to imagine a liberal pluralist democracy having
perfectionism as a root,79 or a theocracy having a jurisprudence of right. In
modem states, dynamic jurisprudence certainly cuts against the grain. Rights-
and duty-based jurisprudences have been root positions only in revolutionary
states. They never last. Only common law, of all the dynamic forms of
jurisprudence, seems able to sustain a root position in the modem state,
because it accords the state a role, albeit limited, in the legal system. The
politically active representatives of centralizing bureaucracies prefer naturalism
or positivism in the root position, since correlation-maintenance provides an
attractive justification for power80 Once static jurisprudence occupies a root
position, bureaucracies suppress dynamic jurisprudence as a threat to this
justification.
77. Id. at 116-20.
78. The exemplary text on the embeddedness of law in a tradition is FREDERICK C. VON SAVIGNY, OF
THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Legal Classics 1986) (Abraham
Hayward trans., 1831). The counter-revolution underway in certain countries of the former Soviet Union
may be described as "Savigny's revenge." The root position of a jurisprudence must grow out of history,
language, and culture.
79. Though "civic republicanism" sometimes has that flavor. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 4, at
18-19; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
80. Rights-based jurisprudence is anathema to the command principle of centralizing bureaucracies.
Duty-based jurisprudence can provide certain charismatic officers a role as "great teacher," but it too is
ultimately anathema to bureaucratic principles. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE
OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 244 (Guenther Roth & Claus WVittich eds. & Ephraim Fischoff et a]. trans.,
1968).
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Nevertheless, a legal system cannot eliminate forms of jurisprudence not
in the root position-it can only suppress them. It is hard to stop people from
organizing action around unrecognized forms. A legal system may cast them
into oblivion, but they always return to challenge the root position. A jurispru-
dence in the root position may resist the challenge, or rejected forms of
jurisprudence may transform its doctrines, logic, and practice. Let us call
"impermeable" the boundary set by a jurisprudence resisting transformation by
unrecognized forms of jurisprudence, and "permeable" the boundary set by a
nonresisting jurisprudence.
A. Permeable and Relatively Permeable Boundaries
A legal system whose boundary is impermeable tightly controls the class
of rules that parties, orienting themselves towards applying a rule, expect
judges to apply. Control is maintained by clearly marking rules that belong to
the class and limiting inclusion in the class. Limiting inclusion may, but need
not, take the form of positivist procedures to restrict methods for determining
inclusion. 81 Similarly, inclusion may be limited by naturalist efforts to narrow
the class of persons by whom, or occasions upon which, membership may be
determined.8" A legal system whose boundary is permeable does not control
the class of rules in these ways.
Certainly the forms of jurisprudence ought to vary in their potential for
permeability. While we know little about these potentials,83 we do know that
one root position-common law-has a structure consistent with a permeable
boundary. Though common law celebrates the ongoing achievement and
destruction of correlations, it must tolerate momentary freezings of correlations,
justified on either positivist or naturalist grounds, in order to accomplish what
it celebrates. 84 Common law thus can serve as the jurisprudence of a
81. Hart's "rule of recognition" is such a method. HART, supra note 39, at 92-96.
82. Owen Fiss describes this restriction as "bounded objectivity." Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1982).
83. Take, for example, the jurisprudence of duty. It must resist forms of jurisprudence in which the
virtues of a legal commander are not the immediate motives of actors. What if one of the virtues was
loving fellow members of a perfectionist community? Rights-based jurisprudence would be the appropriate
instrument for achieving this virtue. But the love persons bear each other must be conditioned on striving
to perfect all the virtues, not just the virtue of love. How would the legal system formed by this
jurisprudence arbitrate tensions between love and perfection? We do not know.
Take, again, correlating jurisprudence, when a duty-based jurisprudence impermeably occupies the
root position, as it did, say, in Maoist China. We would expect the formation of hidden correlating
agencies, apart from the state, and an invisible exercise of violence. Other connections among the forms
of jurisprudence pose other, equally difficult, questions.
84. Cf Charles Yablon, Timeless Rules: Can Normative Closure and Legal Indeterminacy Be
Reconciled?, 13 CARDoZO L. REv. 1605, 1617 (1992) ("[N]ormative closure, the ability to differentiate
legal from nonlegal action and communication, is a necessary condition for the assertion of legal
indeterminacy."). Frank Michelman pointed out to me in a letter that common law differs qualitatively from
other forms of dynamic jurisprudence, precisely because it can easily encompass all other static and
dynamic root positions.
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centralized, bureaucratic state by permitting and incorporating positivist and
naturalist elements. It also welcomes the disruption of correlations by either
rights- or duty-based jurisprudence, which then become auxiliaries to the
common law project. In the Anglo-American system, it permits and incorpo-
rates a duty-based jurisprudence in the parallel system of equity, and commo-
diously accommodates a constitutional jurisprudence of right.
If common law could act without challenge as a jurisprudential position,
we would expect the boundary of the legal system to be completely permeable.
We would expect no difference between informal and formal. Yet the very
permeability of its boundary exposes common law to colonization 5 by static
jurisprudence.86 Common law then evolves into positivism or naturalism, or
both at once.87 As static jurisprudence colonizes a legal system, its boundary
becomes less permeable. A common law system, thus altered, has a relatively
permeable boundary.8"
B. Three Predictions: The Trace
Permeability suggests three predictions. First, an impermeable boundary
ought to yield a large informal sector; a permeable boundary, a small one.
Second, informal institutions facing an impermeable boundary ought to be
highly developed, but poorly developed when facing a permeable boundary.
Finally, the jurisprudence of the informal sector ought to have an impact on
formal jurisprudence when the boundary is permeable, and ought not when the
boundary is impermeable. The impact ought to have two components: a free
exchange of norms between informality and formality, and a trace of forms of
dynamic jurisprudence in the formal jurisprudence.
These predictions are borne out in a comparison of the informal sectors of
the United States and Peru. Hernando de Soto describes a densely positivist
legal system, impermeable to the "extra-legal norms" governing the informal
sector of Peru's economy.8 9 On the other hand, the root position of
jurisprudence in the United States is common law, the jurisprudence of
permeability. These are good cases for testing the predictions.
85. I refer here to Jtlrgen Habermas's notion of "colonization of the lifeworld," in JORGEN HABERMAS,
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AcTION, VOLUME TWO: LIFEWORLD AND SYsTEM: A CRITIQUE OF
FUNcTIONALIsT REASON 355, 392 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
86. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 191-95.
87. Duty-based jurisprudence tends to degrade into positivism; rights-based jurisprudence, into
naturalism.
88. Legal systems whose root position is static can achieve a relatively permeable boundary from the
other direction, by incorporating common law elements. See generally JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES
OF THE LAW 503-06 (1968).
89. DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 132-51, 196-98.
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1. Size
During the six year period in the early 1980's that de Soto's Instituto
Libertad y Democracia studied Peru, 48% of Peru's economically active
population and 61.2% of its work hours were devoted to informal activities,
contributing 38.9% of GDP as recorded in the national accounts.90 Forty-
seven percent of Lima's population lived in 42.6% of its dwellings on illegally
acquired land.9t In the United States in 1980, informal GDP was only 14%
of total GDP.92 The informal sector in Peru occupied almost triple the
percentage GDP occupied by the informal sector in the United States.
2. Institutions
Peru has a vast network of informal institutions. The informal sector has
been forced to develop, as well as it can, substitutes for the formal legal
system, since access to the formal legal system is prohibitively expensive.93
Shasta County landowners, by contrast, live for the most part in the formal
economy. They enter informality for the same reason de Soto's informals do
in Peru, because it is cheaper, but over a far slimmer portfolio of transactions.
3. The Trace
De Soto describes a state wholly resistant to informal processes, with
exchanges between formal and informal only by corruption. In one
extraordinary instance the government sponsored an invasion to create a
housing project.94 But this event only underscores the state's resistance. In the
United States, by contrast, mechanisms abound for the exchange of norms
between formality and informality. A handful of these were described in Part I.
Formal jurisprudence in the United States has two exemplary doctrines,
fiduciary obligation and the constitutional doctrine of individual rights that
engrave a trace of dynamic jurisprudence in the formal jurisprudence. Traces,
in general, are of two sorts. They record an absence (a removal of a portion
of the material of the receiving medium, like a track in sand), or a presence
(an. addition of material of a different sort on top of the receiving medium, like
crayon).
90. Id. at 12.
91. Id. at- 13, 18.
92. Barry Molefsky, America's Underground Economy, in TANZI, supra note 4, at 52. The estimate
was based upon the relationship between currency in circulation (cash) and demand deposits (checking
accounts). The result is obviously different than the result one would obtain using the definition of
informality described in Part I.
93. DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 26-29.
94. Id. at 51-53.
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Fiduciary obligation is a trace of the first sort. It records an absence of
normative material, suspension of the norms of static jurisprudence. The norm
that will govern the fiduciary's obligation cannot be known in advance of the
fiduciary's exercise of judgment and thus has none of the qualities of positivist
or naturalist norms. A fiduciary norm applies only to the situation of the
parties to which it is being applied retrospectively, not to "like" cases.'
Nevertheless, because they are etched in the legal system established by
static jurisprudence, fiduciary norms take the form of generally applicable,
forward-looking norms. Fiduciary law warns fiduciaries that they have a duty
of loyalty and must manage the affairs of beneficiaries prudently. Fiduciary
law develops rules of thumb for these duties, which begin to resemble ordinary
norms of static jurisprudence. On the surface, fiduciary law looks as if it can
be colonized by static jurisprudence, like common law. Yet rules of thumb are
only presumptive-starting-points for analysis.96 Fiduciary law reserves a
right to scrutinize every aspect of a transaction, possibly ousting rules of
thumb.97 It asserts a limitless, general supervisory power.
Because fiduciary norms take the form of generally applicable, forward-
looking norms, lawyers can easily forget or reject their inherent supervisory
power. Thus, law and economics scholars have urged the formulation, in
advance, of crisp, precise fiduciary rules that parties can opt out of by
contract.98 Their vision of fiduciary obligation utterly suppresses its
supervisory power, shifting it from trace to static jurisprudence. The drafters
of the new Revised Uniform Partnership Act have thoroughly implemented the
contract model of fiduciary obligation by confining it to a list of precise
obligations that fiduciaries can alter by contract.99 The old Uniform Partner-
ship Act assumed the existence of a supervisory power, without even
expressing it in the form of a static norm."
95. See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the
Common Law, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 623-27 (1980).
96. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J.
879, 909-10 (arguing that analysis of fiduciary obligations is content-dependent).
97. Compare Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119 (1976) (laying down rules for applying constructive
trust remedy) with Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 241-42 (1978) (criticizing laying down of rules).
98. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 427 (1993) ("[A] 'fiduciary' relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high costs
of specification and monitoring.").
99. For a thorough review and criticism of this adventure, see Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REv. 523 (1993).
Professor Vestal describes the "desire of some contractarian proponents for a static and inflexible regime
of partnership law." Id. at 542; see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate To Appropriate
Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 111,
156 (1993) ("Mo apply the corporate law contractarian model to partnerships is to prevent users of
different business forms from having available the unique characteristics of partnerships."). For related
issues raised by the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, see William W. Bratton,
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1084 (1993).
100. The old act uses the term "fiduciary" only once, in the title to the section on accounting. See
Unif. Partnership Act, § 21, 6 U.L.A. 258 (1969).
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The doctrine of individual rights is a trace of the second sort-an addition
of different normative material on top of the receiving medium. Individual
rights describe a power of resistance to static jurisprudence. Unlike fiduciary
obligation, the doctrine of individual rights does not put norms into suspense.
Rather, it sets a boundary around the reach of norms. It is a normative
constraint on the production of norms. The issue is whether constraining norms
have the same structure as constrained ones. Do they give rise to correlative
duties? We do not usually think of the state as having a duty not to enact
norms exceeding the constraint; judges simply do not apply them. Do
constraining norms mark a limit in advance, as do static norms, or do they
work in the supervisory way of fiduciary obligation?
These dilemmas suggest two familiar axes of dispute: whether an
individual right is enumerable or not enumerable,'0 ' and whether it is a rule
or a standard.102 These axes yield, in principle, four positions, each assigning
to individual rights successively more supervisory power: they are enumerable
rules, enumerable standards, inenumerable rules, or inenumerable standards. At
least two positions were crisply taken in opinions from a canonical text on
individual rights, Griswold v. Connecticut.103 Justice Douglas, in his opinion
for the Court, derives a constitutional right of privacy from the "penumbra" of
enumerated rights. 1 4 Some rights, at least, are inenumerable standards.
Justice Black, in dissent, rejects the creation of a right of privacy independent
of a "specific constitutional provision" protecting it. 5 "Surely it has to be
admitted," he writes, "that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives
such blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto over the
wisdom and value of legislative policies and to hold unconstitutional those
laws which they believe unwise or dangerous."' 6 For Black, individual
rights are enumerable rules.'0 7
The extreme approaches to individual rights, as inenumerable standards
and enumerable rules, show the same tension between static and dynamic that
101. One collection of essays debating enumerability is JACK N. RAKOVE, INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1990).
102. On rules versus standards in constitutional interpretation, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992).
103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104. Id. at 483-86.
105. Id. at 510.
106. Id. at 512.
107. It is tempting to locate the separate concurring opinions of Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and White
in intermediate categories. Justices Goldberg and White seem to treat individual rights as enumerable stan-
dards, by virtue of their emphases, respectively, on a penumbra of the Ninth Amendment, id. at 487, 499,
and an interpretation of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 502. Justice Harlan seems to treat
individual rights as inenumerable rules, by virtue of his emphasis on the "basic values 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."' Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Intermediate positions, including these, most often have too many subtleties and tensions to be allocated
neatly to boxes. After all, judges taking these positions sometimes want to avoid being seen as taking a
position.
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marks fiduciary law.'08 The trace preserves dynamism when judges and
legislators emphasize an illimitable supervisory power and is absorbed by static
jurisprudence when they reduce it to enumerable rules or contract.
IV.
The informal economy asks lawyers to stop, look, and listen as they
approach the boundary of a legal system. Only regulatory law, such as criminal
law or administrative regulation, looks over the boundary to transactions on the
other side. Static jurisprudence otherwise treats transactions over the boundary
in a live-and-let-live fashion, as if they were in a legally unregulated condition,
and as if the unregulated condition has no effect on its norms. A legal system
run along dynamic lines, by contrast, never reaches a boundary. It has no
outside, no inside. All transactions, in principle, belong to it.
Neither position, static or dynamic, is true. Neither is false. Static
jurisprudence can create a boundary. Dynamic jurisprudence always breaches
it. How little, how much, affects the character of norms within the boundary.
All persons, especially ones in a legal system run along static lines, live
and work in the informal economy. The informal economy is much more vast
from a legal perspective than social scientists might have wished or imagined.
Our rights and powers in transactions depend on the experience of living and
working outside the legal system, in the informal economy. We are less
powerful as persons without it.
The effect of the jurisprudence bred in the informal economy is an
unmitigated good, enhancing our powers in general, and in particular the power
to resist or reform commands of the state. Nevertheless, the cost of achieving
that effect may be higher than we, as a moral community, wish to pay. These
are the choices we must make collectively in our work as citizens.
108. The citizens' suit in environmental law is a third doctrine exemplifying the trace. It shows the
same tension as do the law of fiduciaries and the doctrine of individual rights. The fault-line expressing
the tension is whether "private attorneys general" ought to be able to settle citizens' suits to promote non-
environmental benefits over the environmental values expressed in the statute. See generally David S.
Mann, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse of
Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?, 21 ENvTL. L. 175 (1991); Eric Felten, Money from Pollution
Suits Can Follow a Winding Course, INSIGHT, Feb. 18, 1991, at 18-20; cf. Michael S. Greve, The Private
Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 342 (1990) ("[E]nvironmentalist enforcers reap
economic rewards and ... their strategies and case selection are necessarily determined by these rewards,
not by public (environmental) benefits.") The environmental review process implicitly accommodates
private interests in the implementation of statutory standards. See Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA
Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1668, 1723-37 (1993) (urging a "human impact
statement" in new property settings).
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